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Abstract 
This article contributes to the debate on aid volatility and argues that official assistance copes 
with exogenous output shocks in recipient countries and stabilizes resources available for the 
financing of consumption, investment and net trade. Stabilizing aid is effective in aid-
dependent and vulnerable states. Aid volatility and disbursement lags are not significant 
determinants of the stabilizing impact of aid. 
Résumé 
Cet article participe au débat sur l’instabilité de l’aide au développement et soutient que celle-
ci fait face aux chocs exogènes qui affectent la production et stabilise les ressources 
nationales finançant la consommation, l’investissement et la balance commerciale. Le rôle 
stabilisateur de l’aide est particulièrement présent dans les pays fortement dépendants de 
l’aide et dans ceux les plus vulnérables aux chocs extérieurs. Ni l’instabilité de l’aide ni ses 
délais de déboursements n’apparaissent comme des facteurs déterminants du rôle stabilisateur 
ou non de l’aide extérieure.       
Keywords: Foreign aid, Income stabilization, Developing countries. 
JEL Codes: F35, E32, E60. 
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1 Introduction 
Official foreign aid is a major source of revenue for developing countries. Its effectiveness in 
terms of growth and poverty reduction is a much-debated question. No clear consensus has 
emerged on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier 
and Dollar (2002) argue that aid effectiveness depends on sound economic policies and good 
institutions. In contrast to this main stream, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) have shown that 
a major factor conditioning aid effectiveness in recipient countries is the economic 
vulnerability they face. This last factor is due to external shocks or climatic events and natural 
disasters. If economic vulnerability is a determinant of aid effectiveness, it is mainly due to its 
stabilization impact. Collier and Dehn (2001) have demonstrated the positive effect of 
increasing aid during negative shocks in relation to the terms of trade. Thereby, aid is an 
important device to cope with output fluctuations. Corresponding welfare gain might be 
sizeable2. 
The stabilization properties of aid have recently become the cornerstone of the debate. In this 
new controversy, there is a growing point of view suggesting that aid is an important source 
of macroeconomic instability as it is volatile and thus unpredictable in many developing 
countries. Therefore uncertainty in aid flows might undermine its effectiveness (Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2000 and Hudson and Mosley, 2008)3. As a consequence in the Paris declaration 
of 2005, donors have committed to improve the predictability of aid disbursements by raising 
their multi-annual aid commitments. Most notably, aid tends to be procyclical rather than 
countercyclical, i.e. disbursements increase during expansion episodes and decrease in 
recession periods. Aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance 
mechanism (e.g. Gemmell and McGillivray 1998, Pallage and Robe 2001, Bulir and Hamann 
                                                           
2
 Pallage and Robe (2003) estimate that macroeconomic fluctuations are much stronger and costly in developing 
countries than in the United States. For example, on average, the welfare cost of output volatility in sub-Saharan 
Africa could be as much as 15-20 times higher than that in the United States. Furthermore, Kose (2002) obtains 
that most of the shocks in developing countries have exogenous roots. 
3
 Lensink and Morrissey (2000) were the first to notice that aid uncertainty might be a dimension of aid 
effectiveness. They estimate in a growth equation that aid volatility reduces aid effectiveness. Hudson and 
Mosley (2008) confirm that aid volatility has a negative impact on growth. The differentiation between positive 
and negative volatility indicates that the damage is caused by positive volatility. 
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2003, 2008, Hudson and Mosley 2008 and Fielding and Mavrotas 2008)4. 
However, the link between aid volatility, aid cyclicality and stabilizing aid is not self-evident. 
Even if aid is procyclical, it can be stabilizing if its fluctuations are lower than those of the 
output. Countercyclical aid might be destabilizing if aid fluctuations are higher than the 
output ones. According to the magnitude of its variability, procyclical or countercyclical aid 
could smooth out exogenous output shocks in recipient countries. In a stabilization purpose, 
aid flows cannot be expected to be completely stable through time. Thus, analyses based on 
aid volatility could be misleading, since they overshadow the compensatory property of aid. 
Compensatory or stabilizing aid is more relevant than aid volatility (e.g. Chauvet and 
Guillaumont 2009)5. 
This article focuses on the compensatory or stabilizing profile of official aid in recipient states 
experiencing GDP fluctuations. Our paper is connected to the works of Gupta et al. (2004) 
and Pallage et al. (2006). On the one hand, Gupta et al. (2004) examine cyclical properties of 
food aid with respect to food availability in recipient countries on a large sample of 
developing and transition economies. They show that food aid is countercyclical in countries 
with the greatest need for such aid and insufficient means to mitigate contemporaneous 
shortfall in consumption. On the other hand, Pallage et al. (2006) show that changing the 
timing of aid flows could substantially smooth consumption and ease the welfare costs of 
macroeconomic fluctuations in recipient countries. However, our approach is different. We 
leave the debate on cyclical aid aside. We are interested in the role of official aid in coping 
with exogenous fluctuations in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We assess the contribution of 
aid in the stabilization of resources available for the financing of consumption, investment 
and net trade in recipient after an output shock.  
We use a method based on national accounts initiated by Asdrubali et al. (1996) in order to 
identify flows that are able to ensure public or private consumption in industrial countries 
                                                           
4
 Gemmell and McGillivray (1998) were the first to comment on aid instability. They show that, with the 
exception of capital revenues, aid flows are the most volatile. Likewise, Pallage and Robe (2001) and Bulir and 
Hamann (2003, 2008) obtain that aid is highly volatile, unpredictable and overwhelmingly procyclical. Hudson 
and Mosley (2008) and Fielding and Mavrotas (2008) estimate that lesser aid instability is associated with good 
institutions, sound policies, a large number of donors and a high dependency on circumstantial aid, such as food 
aid, emergency aid, and program/budget support aid. 
5
 Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009) compare the volatility of exports to the volatility of aid plus exports. They 
find that aid contributes to the dampening of the volatility of exports of goods and services. 
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5 
against asymmetric shocks6. 
Our results indicate that foreign aid is partly stabilizing and could be used as an insurance 
device in developing countries. We also find that aid dependency and output volatility 
increase the effectiveness of stabilizing aid. Further, aid volatility or disbursement lags (i.e. 
the inverse of disbursement speeds) do not appear as significant determinants of the 
stabilizing impact of aid. . 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. We 
present the decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of GDP that allows us to estimate 
the contribution of aid to resource stabilization. The third section describes the dataset and 
comments on the empirical results. The final section concludes and discusses the main policy 
implications of the study. 
2 Methodology 
In order to assess the contribution of official aid to resource stabilization, we apply the 
method of the decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of output growth introduced by 
Asdrubali et al. (1996). The methodology involves the use of national accounts and allows 
them to investigate to what extent a fluctuation in gross domestic product is or is not 
translated to consumption. Here, we adapt the approach with the purpose to analyze whether 
public aid is a channel, thanks to which variations in domestic product are not fully 
transmitted to available resources in the recipient country and possibly to consumption. By 
available resources, we mean the sum of national income and public aid that finances national 
expenditure. 
2.1 Multiplicity of aid aggregates 
Several distinctions in aid aggregates are useful to analyze whether or not aid is stabilizing. 
First, we separate bilateral and multilateral aid, as the motivations of the two categories of 
donors seem to be different. Second, according to the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development), an interstate financial flow which contains at least a 25% 
grant component (computed with a constant discount rate of 10%) is considered as aid, i.e. 
                                                           
6
 Since then, the method has been regularly used in the context of industrial countries (e.g. Sorensen and Yosha 
1998, Arreaza et al. 1998, Asdrubali and Kim 2004 and Alfonso and Furceri 2008). 
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Official Development Assistance (ODA). Then, public foreign aid includes official grants and 
official concessional loans with at least 25% of the grant’s element. 
ODA = Grants + Concessional loans       (1) 
Grants and concessional loans are not allocated to the same type of countries (grants are often 
reserved to low income countries) and are not intended for the same sectors (grants often 
finance social projects, whereas loans are reserved to profitable projects or government 
budgets). It is then possible that grants and loans diverge in their timing and therefore in their 
stabilizing impact. One may assume that loans are more flexible and thus more stabilizing. 
Indeed, grants are generally used to finance structural needs in poor countries and they are 
more permanent than loans that finance occasional needs as productive investments. 
Moreover and above all, grants include debt forgiveness of commercial debts7 that results 
from international agreements8 imposing conditions relative to their policies to recipient 
countries and to be effective suppose an improvement of their economic situation; the 
assumption that debt forgiveness is rather destabilizing should be verified. Overall, we expect 
that loans are more stabilizing than grants. 
We are also aware that net ODA flows (particularly grants) encompass heterogeneous 
elements. They include flows, which do not correspond to real transfers to recipient countries, 
such as the costs of sponsored foreign students originating from developing countries or the 
help to refugees in donor countries or research expenditure. In principle, debt forgiveness 
avoids the reduction of the available resources in the recipient country. But it is not always 
the case when debt forgiveness would not have been paid off as the country accumulates 
arrears. We try to compute a measurement of aid disbursements, which really go to the 
recipient countries. 
Finally, we apply the same approach to other official flows or private flows so as to 
investigate the specific function of aid as an insurance device against output shocks. 
 
                                                           
7
  According to the OECD rules, only the cancellation of commercial debts (i.e. debts with grant’s element lower 
than 25%) is recorded as ODA. 
8
 As the program of debt cancellation for High Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) launched in 1996. 
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2.2 Econometric strategy 
In national accounts, foreign grants are recorded as current transfers (i.e. financial flows 
without counterpart), whereas foreign loans are recorded as foreign savings. Foreign grants 
are added to National Income (NI) and other transfers (as migrants’ transfers and private 
grants) to obtain the Disposable National Income (DNI) and foreign loans are added to the 
DNI so as to attain available resources in the recipient countries. Consequently, if aid has any 
stabilization impact, it might be studied with respect to available resources, i.e. National 
Income plus Aid (NI+ODA), leaving apart the other transfers and capital flows. Focusing on 
available resources is crucial for developing countries because they finance national 
expenditure and net trade. Hence, more stable resources would induce more stable 
consumption, investment, net trade and thus sustained and stable economic growth. 
The following chain equation can be defined from output to national income and available 
resources: 
i
ti
t
i
t
i
t
i
ti
t )ODANI()ODANI(
NI
NI
GDPGDP +∗
+
∗=        (2) 
GDP denotes the Gross Domestic Product, NI the National Income and (NI+ODA) denotes 
National Income augmented with aid i.e. or national available resources. . These aggregates 
are defined as follows: 
NI = GDP + Net factor income - Capital depreciation, 
NI+ODA = NI + ODA Grants + ODA loans, 
At first glance, equation (2) provides some insights into the channels through which national 
available resources are stabilized by smoothing out GDP shocks during a period shorter than 
one year After an exogenous GDP shock, total stabilization of national income is achieved 
through the adjustment of net factors income and capital depreciation, if NI remains 
unchanged. By the same token, if NI varies and (NI+ODA) remains constant after a shock, 
then available resources stabilization is further obtained through the adjustment of official 
foreign aid. Thus aid contributes to the stabilization of income when national income plus aid 
fluctuates less than national income itself. The shock is not totally stabilized if (NI+ODA) 
fluctuates.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.16 
 
 
 
8 
This methodology assumes that output shocks are independent from aid fluctuations during 
the current period. Such a hypothesis implies that aid has a long-term impact on output 
instead of a yearly effect. The assumption seems plausible. Apart from emergency cases, aid 
usually financed productive expenditure that may have a long-term effect instead of a short-
term impact (e.g. Clemens et al., 2004). However, in a Keynesian context, when unemployed 
productive capacities exist, an increase in demand to domestic producers can induce more 
output in a short term. We address this issue in the econometric estimates. 
A decomposition of output growth can be obtained by taking the logarithms and the first-
differences of equation (2): 
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
)ODANI(Log
])ODANI(LogLogNI[]LogNILogGDP[LogGDP
++
+−+−=
∆
∆∆∆∆∆
  (3) 
From equation (3), the variance of GDP growth is computed as follows: 
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where Cov denotes the covariance defined by )()(*)(),( XYEYEXEYXCov −= 9. The 
division of both sides of equation (4) by the by the variance of GDP growth ][ itLogGDPV ∆
 
leads to the following result: 
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And under the subsequent notations: 
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 In order to compute the variance of output growth from equation (2), we need to compute the difference 
between ])LogGDP[(E 2it∆  and 2it ]LogGDP[E ∆ . First, we multiply and factorize both sides of 
equation (2) by itLogGDP∆  and after we then compute the mathematical expectation of the result. Second, we 
compute the mathematical expectation of equation (2) and multiply the outcome by ]LogGDP[E it∆ . 
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Equation (5) is equivalent to UODAFD1 βββ ++= , where  FDβ  is the slope of the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression of )LogNILogGDP( itit ∆∆ −  on itLogGDP∆ , ODAβ  
corresponds to the OLS regression of ])ODANI(LogLogNI[ itit +− ∆∆  on itLogGDP∆  and 
Uβ  to the regression of it)ODANI(Log +∆  on itLogGDP∆
 
(the β  slope of the OLS 
regression of variables Y on X is defined as )(
),(
XV
YXCov
=β ). 
The β-coefficients are, in that case, interpreted as measures of incremental percentages of 
GDP shocks stabilized at each level of the decomposition aforementioned. Thereby the 
coefficients FDβ  and ODAβ  respectively denote the incremental percentage of output shocks 
compensated by net factors income adjusted for capital depreciation and by official aid. uβ  
gives the proportion of shocks, which are not smoothed out with respect to national income. 
The β-coefficients
 
could be either positive or negative. A positive coefficient would indicate a 
stabilization channel whereas a negative one would imply a destabilization channel. 
We are interested in the coefficient ODAβ
 
, which ensues from the identity decomposition. It is 
then possible to calculate the coefficients for each country and each year. However, in a first 
time, we are interested in the average coefficient for a group of countries during a given 
period. Therefore, the coefficient ODAβ
 
is estimated through the following panel regression: 
i
t,ODA
i
tODA
i
t
i
t
i
t eLogGDP)ODANI(LogLogNI +∗=+− ∆β∆∆      (6) 
The terms i te.,  denote the error terms. Intuitively, if a country experiences an exogenous drop 
in its GDP by 5% that yields to a fall in NI by 5%, whereas its (NI+ODA) decreases only by 
4%, then ODA contribute to stabilize 20% of the initial shocks. The corresponding coefficient 
ODAβ  is 0.2. 
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The estimate of the equation (6) with the simple OLS is problematic because of the potential 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in data. A two-step Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is 
then needed. The first step applies the clustering technique to correct heteroskedasticity. It 
also uses the procedure of Cochrane-Orcutt to correct the potential autocorrelation of the error 
terms. In doing so, we assume for each country that the error terms follow an AR (1) process.  
Moreover, the methodology of output variance decomposition was intensively criticized in the 
literature. The main critique focuses on the assumption of exogenous output shocks vis-à-vis 
stabilization channels (e.g. Mélitz and Zùmer 1999, Bayoumi 1999). If this supposition does 
not hold, there is a simultaneity bias in equation (6) and the OLS estimate is not robust. For 
this reason, the second step applies the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates with the purpose 
of identifying exogenous output shocks. In the literature, it is well established that terms of 
trade are an important source of exogenous shocks in developing countries (Mendoza, 1995) 
as well as agricultural shocks (Da Rocha and Restuccia, 2006). We therefore catch exogenous 
shocks in our sample by using the first difference of the terms of trade index and agricultural 
output growth as instruments of GDP growth. We also add the one period lagged value GDP 
growth to instruments so as to account for a feedback effect in the output process. The use of 
the first differences removes country fixed effects and ensures that all variables are 
covariance-stationary.  
Our panel analysis allows us to estimate the average impact of stabilizing aid. In a second 
time, we apply the same approach country by country and we analyze the determinants of the 
various ODAβ
 
coefficients in order to understand if the effectiveness of stabilizing aid depends 
on some differences between recipient countries, more or less prone to exogenous shocks and 
depending on aid. We may also look at whether aid instability or aid lags prevent resource 
stabilization. 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data 
Our dataset covers 78 developing and transition countries from 1981 to 2006 for which data 
on net ODA are available. We excluded countries that obtained their independence between 
1981 and 2006. The sample comprises 37 African states, 22 American states, 16 from Asia 
and 3 from the Pacific. The list of countries is provided in appendix 1. 
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We collect information on net aid disbursements on the OECD-DAC (Development 
Assistance Committee) website. We take data on total net ODA, multilateral and bilateral 
ODA, total concessional loans, total grants, debt forgiveness, humanitarian aid, food aid and 
technical cooperation. Aid data in current USD are converted in constant 2000 USD by 
dividing for each country, the aid’s original figures by the ratio of GDP in current USD and 
GDP in constant USD.  
In order to have a measurement of aid flows corresponding (approximately) to real transfers 
to recipient countries, we first subtract technical cooperation which comprises grants to 
nationals of recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad and 
payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and 
administrators. Secondly, we also subtract debt forgiveness, as it does not necessarily induce 
more available resources for recipient country. Furthermore, we subtract emergency flows, 
which are naturally countercyclical. This aid concept is closed to the notion of programmable 
aid recently computed as predictable ODA10. 
In order to compare official aid to other flows, we use data relative to other official flows 
(OOF) and private flows (PF) from the OECD website. We also collect in the World 
Development Indicators 2008, the data on current USD GDP, constant 2000 GDP, current 
USD GNP, consumption of fixed capital in percentage of GNP, constant 2000 USD 
agricultural value added, terms of trade (net barter terms) basis 100 in 2000 and population. 
National income is computed as GNP less consumption of fixed capital. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of data used in the empirical analysis. All the data 
are expressed in real term and per capita. On average in the sample, GDP per capita and NI 
per capita are respectively about 1,576 USD and 1,350 USD. External financial flows are 
much smaller. On average, other official flows are 7 USD, private flows 35 USD and net 
ODA per capita 40 USD. Net ODA is characterized by the importance of the bilateral part for 
                                                           
10
 According to the Development Assistance Committee glossary, programmable aid reflects the amount of aid 
that can be programmed by the donor at partner country level. It is defined through exclusions, by subtracting 
from total ODA unpredictable aid by nature (humanitarian aid and debt forgiveness and reorganization), no 
cross-border flows (development research in donor country, promotion of development awareness, imputed 
student costs, refugees in donor country and administrative costs), aid that is not part of co-operation agreements 
between governments (food aid and aid extended by local governments in donor countries), aid that is not 
programmable by the donor (core funding to national NGOs and International NGOs) or that is not susceptible 
for programming at country level (e.g. contributions to Public Private Partnerships, for some donors aid extended 
by other agencies than the main aid agency). A long series of programmable aid is unfortunately not available.  
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27 USD and grants for 33 USD. Debt forgiveness constitutes, on average, a quarter of grants. 
In addition, official assistance represents a small fraction of GDP (on average 6.8%). This 
implies that the expected stabilization achieved through aid is necessarily limited. However, a 
closer look reveals that a significant number of countries are highly dependent on aid. About a 
quarter of countries, the poorest in the sample, have their Aid/GDP ratio higher than 10%. For 
instance, in Mozambique, the most aid dependent in our sample, has received on average 
from 1981 to 2006 32% of GDP. Therefore, stabilization realized by aid might be important 
in such countries and relevant for donor aid policies. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Average SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
Other Official Flows (OOF)* 7.752 46.119 -227.473 1,429.494 1,602 
Private Flows (PF)* 35.894 175.276 -1,838.901 1,999.477 1,604 
Official Development Assistance (ODA)* 40.103 55.019 -119.964 610.583 1,630 
Multilateral ODA* 12.175 17.610 -19.510 205.730 1,630 
Bilateral ODA* 27.927 42.864 -132.882 498.857 1,630 
ODA grants* 33.489 46.132 0.087 401.703 1,630 
ODA loans* 6.6140 22.418 -150.338 278.121 1,630 
Food aid* 2.210 4.494 -2.872 48.593 1,351 
Humanitarian aid* 1.123 3.860 0 84.136 1,395 
Technical cooperation* 11.584 17.063 -9.058 176.824 1,630 
Debt forgiveness* 8.762 24.103 0.000 192.307 549 
National Income* 1,350.479 1,441.728 69.138 7956.213 1,630 
GDP* 1,576.614 1,732.549 81.009 9,497.559 1,630 
Terms of trade* 107.646 32.994 39.744 357.576 1,630 
Log (Agricultural value added) 21.132 1.760 16.453 26.145 1,630 
ODA/GDP ratio (%) 6.814 8.907 -2.741 95.482 1,630 
*Data are in constant 2000 USD and in per capita terms. SD is the standard deviation. 
 
3.2 Panel analysis 
Our results contrast with the common wisdom according to which foreign aid is highly 
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volatile and destabilizing in recipient countries. We find that official flows and mostly official 
development assistance does cope with a sizeable fraction of GDP shocks, stabilize available 
resources and thereby could be used as an insurance device in developing countries. 
We estimate for the whole sample the contribution of ODA to resource stabilization as 
presented in equation (6). Both OLS and IV results are reported in Table 2. The IV estimates 
are generally robust. For instance, in the first stage, the R-squared is reasonable (0.435) and 
the F-statistic is significant at 1% (Table 2, column [2]). The estimated coefficients indicate 
that the fraction of GDP shocks smoothed out is 13.2% with the OLS (significant at 10%) and 
13% with the IV (significant at 1%). 
We do an in-depth analysis on the contribution of net ODA according to donors and the extent 
of aid concessionality. We compare ODA provided by bilateral donors to the ODA provided 
by multilateral agencies. Results indicate that, in line with its relative important size, bilateral 
aid is more stabilizing than the multilateral aid. Estimated coefficients for bilateral and 
multilateral ODA are robust (Table 3, columns [1]-[4]). Bilateral ODA contributes to ease 
9.5% (OLS) and 8% (IV) of shocks, whereas multilateral aid only smoothes out 5% (OLS) 
and 5.6% (IV) of shocks. 
Next, we contrast the contributions of ODA grants and ODA loans. In Table 4, the 
comparison of columns [1] and [2] to columns [7] and [8] reveals that, as expected, the 
stabilizing property of foreign assistance is attributed to concessional loans. ODA loans 
smoothed out 7.5% (OLS) and 11.4% (IV) of GDP shocks. Contrary to concessional loans, 
the estimated coefficients for grants are positive but not significant. However, when debt 
forgiveness is excluded, grants are as stabilizing as ODA loans (Table 4, column [4]). As 
anticipated in columns [5] and [6], debt forgiveness could be destabilizing in the extent that it 
would really increase available resources. 
Furthermore, as previously noted, net ODA covers heterogeneous flows. Some components 
are imputed but not really transferred to recipient countries. We also separate emergency 
flows, as they are naturally countercyclical. Therefore we exclude humanitarian aid, food aid 
and technical cooperation from aid figures. Results in Table 5 indicate that excluding the 
automatic countercyclical aid components and the no cross-border elements, aid is 
significantly stabilizing for 15.8% of GDP shocks with the OLS and 9.9% with the IV. When 
moreover we subtract debt forgiveness, the β-coefficient is even higher (23-24% of GDP 
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shocks are stabilized), but we must note that according to the Hansen-Sargan test the 
instrumentation is no more valid. 
Placed side by side to other financial flows toward developing countries, foreign aid appears 
remarkably stabilizing. With the purpose of making a comparison, we conduct a similar 
analysis for other official flows (OOF) and private flows (PF). We obtain that official flows 
are usually stabilizing, whereas private flows are destabilizing. Resource stabilization 
obtained from net OOF is relatively low. They contribute to absorb 2.2% with the OLS and 
3% with the IV (Table 6, columns [1] and [2]). Net ODA and net OOF jointly smooth out 
about 15% of output shocks. Radically different from official flows, net private flows are 
destabilizing. The estimated coefficient in Table 6, columns [3] and [4] is between -6.3% 
(OLS) and -7.5% (IV). 
 
Table 2: Official Development Assistance 
 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
 OLS IV 
 [1] [2] 
Coefficient β 0.132* 0.130*** 
 (0.068) (0.035) 
First stage   
R2   0.435 
F-statistic  Sig. 
Hansen-Sargan probability  0.59 
Observations 1630 1548 
Countries 78 78 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; IV: the first difference of GDP is instrumented by its one 
period lagged value and by the first difference of terms of trade and agricultural value 
added. Sig.: The F-statistic is significant at 1%. Estimates are corrected for potential 
autocorrelation AR (1) and for heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA 
 Bilateral ODA Multilateral ODA 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Coefficient β 0.095* 0.080*** 0.050** 0.056** 
 (0.052) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) 
First stage     
R2   0.475  0.472 
F-statistic  Sig.  Sig. 
Hansen-Sargan probability  0.04  0.84 
Observations 1629 1548 1629 1548 
Countries 78 78 78 78 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; IV: the first difference of GDP is instrumented by its one period lagged 
value and by the first difference of terms of trade and agricultural value added. Sig.: The F-statistic is 
significant at 1%. Estimates are corrected for potential autocorrelation AR (1) and for heteroskedasticity. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: ODA Grants and ODA Loans 
 ODA Grants Debt forgiveness (a) ODA Loans 
 With debt forgiveness Without debt forgiveness   
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Coefficient β 0.074 0.044 0.122 0.125*** -0.096** -0.161*** 0.075*** 0.114*** 
 (0.068) (0.034) (0.076) (0.038) (0.036) (0.061) (0.021) (0.031) 
First stage         
R2   0.468  0.388  0.512  0.555 
F-statistic  Sig.  Sig.  Sig.  Sig. 
Hansen-Sargan probability   0.61  0.33  0.46  0.05 
Observations 1630 1548 1630 1548 557 549 1630 1548 
Countries 78 78 78 78 48 48 78 78 
(a): Only 48 states in the sample have benefited from debt forgiveness according to the DAC data. Here, we consider countries with missing figures 
have not benefited debt cancellation, i.e. missing figures are not missing observations. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; IV: the first difference of GDP is 
instrumented by its one period lagged value and by the first difference of terms of trade and agricultural value added. Sig.: The F-statistic is significant 
at 1%. Estimates are corrected for potential autocorrelation AR (1) and for heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Total ODA corresponding to real transfers 
 With debt forgiveness Without debt forgiveness 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
 [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Coefficient β 0.158** 0.099*** 0.242*** 0.235*** 
 (0.078) (0.025) (0.079) (0.055) 
First stage     
R2  0.524  0.532 
F-statistic  Sig.  Sig. 
Hansen-Sargan probability  0.52  0.01 
Observations 981 943 981 943 
Countries 68 67 68 67 
Real transfers are computed as total ODA excluding humanitarian aid, food aid and technical cooperation. OLS: 
Ordinary Least Squares; IV: the first difference of GDP is instrumented by its one period lagged value and by the 
first difference of terms of trade and agricultural value added. Sig.: The F-statistic is significant at 1%. Estimates 
are corrected for potential autocorrelation AR (1) and for heteroskedasticity. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: Other Official Flows, Private Flows 
 Other Official Flows (OOF) Private Flows (PF) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Coefficient β 0.022** 0.030** -0.063*** -0.075*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) 
First stage     
R2   0.552  0.563 
F-statistic  Sig.  Sig. 
Hansen-Sargan probability  0.26  0.19 
Observations 1593 1516 1604 1523 
Countries 77 77 77 77 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares; IV: the first difference of GDP is instrumented by its one period lagged value 
and by the first difference of terms of trade and agricultural value added. Sig.: The F-statistic is significant at 
1%. Estimates are corrected for potential autocorrelation AR (1) and for heteroskedasticity. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
3.3 Cross-country analysis 
In order to provide insights into the stabilization property of official aid, we explore 
determinants of the contribution of aid to resource stabilization. We first analyze the 
economic vulnerability of recipient states. Donors may be incited in providing more 
stabilizing aid flows to countries exposed to frequent exogenous shocks. It is then logical to 
anticipate that stabilization achieved through official aid would be positively associated with 
the volatility of output. Second, we examine some features of aid disbursements according to 
each country. In aid dependent countries, a marginal change in the timing of aid flows may be 
more effective in addressing exogenous shocks. For that reason, we may postulate that aid 
dependency is a crucial determinant of the contribution of aid to stabilization. Third, we 
include the speed of aid disbursements in the list of determinants of stabilizing aid. After an 
output shock, a rapid disbursement is likely to be suitable to an output shock and then to 
foster the stabilizing impact of aid inflows; inversely, lags in aid disbursement may prevent 
rapid and countercyclical disbursement. The speed of disbursements depends on the sector 
financed by aid. For instance, supports to government budgets are more flexible and rapidly 
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disbursed than project aid. Finally, the volatility of aid flows is commonly presented as a 
source of unpredictable revenue and of macroeconomic instability. In fact, the anticipated 
impact of aid volatility is ambiguous: as previously noticed, countercyclical or procyclical aid 
flows are stabilizing when their fluctuations are lesser than the fluctuations of recipient 
output, i.e. aid varies less than output. 
We first estimate equation (6) for each country with more than 10 observations in the sample. 
We present descriptive statistics on ODA,iˆβ  coefficients in Table 7. We are able to estimate 65 
β-coefficients from which 18 with the OLS and 17 with the IV are significant at least at 10%. 
The estimated coefficients are mostly positive indicating that aid is generally stabilizing. On 
average, on ODA,iˆβ  is 0.088 with the OLS estimates and 0.103 with the IV. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics on βODA-coefficient by country 
βODA-coefficient OLS IV 
Mean 0.088 0.103 
Standard deviation 0.190 0.200 
Total coefficient β 65 65 
β > 0 52 49 
β < 0 13 16 
Significant β 18 17 
β > 0 18 16 
β < 0 0 1 
The significance is defined at the level of 10%. 
 
After then, we analyze possible determinants through the following regression: 
ikikODA,i Xˆ εϕαβ ++= ∑          (7) 
ODA,i
ˆβ  is the estimated coefficient for the recipient country i from equation (6). The variables 
kiX  denote the country determinants of the stabilization property of aid, i.e. output volatility, 
aid dependency, aid volatility or lags. The volatility of output and aid are respectively 
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computed as the standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita and the growth rate 
of net ODA per capita. Aid dependency is calculated as the average of the aid output ratio. 
The speed of aid disbursements is approximated by the average of the yearly ratio of net ODA 
disbursements on ODA commitments. We also control for some structural factors such as 
colonial relationships between donor and recipient countries (British and French colonization 
dummies), geographical handicaps (Landlocked and Island dummies) and geographical 
locations (African, American and Asian dummies). We also add a dummy for the significance 
at least at 10% of the coefficients ODA,iˆβ . The kϕ  are coefficients to be estimated. The iε  
represent the error terms. We estimate equation (7) with the simple OLS. 
We report results in Table 8. Whatsoever the estimation, we find that foreign official aid tends 
to be more stabilizing in countries facing important output fluctuations and particularly 
dependent on aid. The volatility of GDP and the dependency on aid significantly increase the 
estimated coefficient ODA,iˆβ . The effects of aid volatility and disbursement speed are 
insignificant. We also obtain that aid stabilization is not significantly affected by colonial 
relationships and geographical handicaps. Likewise, geographical location is not a key 
determinant in the stabilization property of aid, except for Latin American countries with the 
IV estimates. 
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Table 8: Determinants of aid stabilization. 
βODA-coefficient OLS IV 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
GDP volatility 3.440** 2.752* 3.492** 2.880* 3.261** 2.634** 3.319** 2.744** 
 
(1.550) (1.523) (1.519) (1.498) (1.315) (1.256) (1.288) (1.188) 
Aid dependency 1.061** 1.144** 1.011** 1.111** 1.398*** 1.529*** 1.353*** 1.510*** 
 
(0.502) (0.489) (0.487) (0.485) (0.467) (0.409) (0.468) (0.406) 
Speed of disbursements  -0.053 -0.051 -0.122 -0.117 -0.100 -0.126 -0.169 -0.214 
 
(0.131) (0.121) (0.157) (0.148) (0.153) (0.146) (0.187) (0.187) 
Aid volatility -0.055 -0.020 -0.066 -0.034 -0.007 0.035 -0.018 0.019 
 
(0.119) (0.116) (0.111) (0.106) (0.099) (0.101) (0.098) (0.099) 
French or British 
colonization 
0.100 0.119* 
  
0.037 0.100 
  
 
(0.069) (0.069) 
  
(0.067) (0.074) 
  
French colonization 
  
0.079 0.095 
  
0.016 0.070 
   
(0.067) (0.067) 
  
(0.073) (0.081) 
British colonization 
  
0.129 0.144* 
  
0.065 0.137* 
   
(0.082) (0.082) 
  
(0.078) (0.076) 
Geographical handicap 
(Landlocked or Island) 
0.043 0.025 
  
0.048 0.027 
  
 
(0.049) (0.050) 
  
(0.048) (0.052) 
  
Landlocked 
  
0.078 0.051 
  
0.082 0.053 
   
(0.067) (0.071) 
  
(0.064) (0.064) 
Island 
  
-0.027 -0.026 
  
-0.018 -0.034 
   
(0.033) (0.033) 
  
(0.047) (0.051) 
Africa -0.011 -0.037 -0.030 -0.046 0.023 -0.031 0.005 -0.041 
 
(0.102) (0.091) (0.079) (0.075) (0.057) (0.064) (0.052) (0.063) 
America 0.149 0.110 0.130 0.102 0.146** 0.136** 0.129** 0.126** 
 
(0.112) (0.099) (0.090) (0.084) (0.070) (0.063) (0.062) (0.057) 
Asia 0.113 0.047 0.092 0.034 0.115** 0.060 0.095** 0.037 
 
(0.101) (0.100) (0.076) (0.081) (0.055) (0.063) (0.043) (0.053) 
Significance dummy 
 
0.118*** 
 
0.109** 
 
0.149** 
 
0.152** 
  
(0.042) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.061) 
Constant -0.182 -0.178 -0.104 -0.112 -0.148 -0.153 -0.072 -0.069 
 
(0.174) (0.173) (0.145) (0.145) (0.156) (0.162) (0.160) (0.175) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
R2 0.27 0.34 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.43 0.37 0.46 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
4 Conclusion 
There is growing debate on the consequences of aid volatility. More than a few authors have 
argued that aid is an important source of macroeconomic instability in developing countries: 
aid is volatile, unpredictable and frequently procyclical, i.e. it is generally disbursed during an 
expansion period in recipient countries and postponed or suspended during downturn periods. 
However, the proposal that volatile aid generates or exacerbates shocks is debatable. Volatile 
aid is not problematic if it contributes to the coping with exogenous shocks in developing 
countries. Stabilizing aid is by definition volatile. Procyclical or countercyclical aid could 
ease output shocks depending on the size of its instability. Analyzing stabilizing aid is then 
more relevant than analyzing volatile or cyclical aid. 
This article studies whether or not aid is stabilizing. We estimate to what extent official 
assistance copes with exogenous output shocks in recipient countries and stabilizes resources 
available for the financing of consumption, investment and net trade. Contrary to private 
flows, net ODA does stabilize available resources against GDP shocks whatever the ODA 
disaggregation (bilateral ODA vs. multilateral ODA, and ODA grants vs. ODA loans). Total 
ODA contributes to smooth out 13% of output shocks while ODA flows corresponding to real 
transfers cope with 24% of shocks. Further, stabilizing aid is more effective in countries 
subject to frequent output fluctuations and countries that are highly dependent on aid. 
If the objective is to stabilize income in developing countries, donor community might 
enhance this property of aid as an insurance device. Stabilizing aid must be disbursed to 
vulnerable and aid dependent countries. This last conclusion contrasts with the common idea 
that aid scaling-up could be a source of growing macroeconomic instability in developing 
countries (see for instance IMF 2005 or World Bank Global Monitoring Report 2005 and 
2006). Most notably, our estimates also indicate that bilateral aid mainly explains stabilizing 
aid. Therefore, multilateral agencies have to focus on the design of stabilizing official 
assistance. Actually, multilateral official assistance is mostly driven by good economic and 
social policies. Indeed, the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment” (CPIA) computed 
by multilateral organizations (World Bank and others) is the predominant criterion in the 
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allocation formula of multilateral development banks. Therefore it would be relevant to 
introduce in these allocation formulas a measurement representing economic vulnerability of 
recipient countries (Guillaumont 2008). Taking into consideration the structural vulnerability 
of countries in the allocation of aid appears urgent as the present global financial and 
economic crisis has detrimental consequences on developing countries. 
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Appendix 1: List of countries 
78 developing and transition countries from 1981 to 2006 
Africa (37) 
Algeria (1981-2005) 
Mozambique (1985-2006) 
Angola (1987-2006) 
Niger (1981-2003) 
Benin (1981-2005) 
Nigeria (1981-2005) 
Botswana (1981-2006) 
Rwanda (1981-2006) 
Burkina Faso (1981-2006) 
Senegal (1981-2006) 
Burundi (1981-2005) 
Seychelles (1986-2006) 
Cameroon (1981-2006) 
South Africa (1995-2006) 
Ca!pe Verde (1988-2006) 
Sudan (1981-2006) 
America (22) 
Argentina (1981-2006) 
Bolivia (1981-2006) 
Brazil (1981-2006) 
Chile (1981-2006) 
Colombia (1981-2006) 
Costa Rica (1981-2006) 
Dominican Republic (1981-2006) 
Ecuador (1981-2006) 
El Salvador (1981-2006) 
Grenada (2001-2005) 
Guatemala (1981-2006) 
Guyana (2001-2005) 
Honduras (1981-2006) 
Jamaica (2001-2006) 
Mexico (1981-2006) 
Nicaragua (1995-2006) 
Asia (16) 
Bangladesh (1981-2006) 
Cambodia (2001-2006) 
China (1981 (2006) 
India (1981-2005) 
Indonesia (1982-2006) 
Malaysia (1981-2006) 
Mongolia (2001-2006) 
Nepal (2001-2006) 
Pakistan (1981-2006) 
Philippines (1981-2006) 
Sri Lanka (1981-2006) 
Thailand (1981-2006) 
Jordan (1981-2006) 
Lebanon (2001-2006) 
Oman-2001-2004) 
Turkey (1981-2006) 
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Congo, Dem. Rep. (1981-2006) 
Swaziland (1981-2006) 
Equatorial Guinea (2001-2006) 
Tanzania (1991-2006) 
Ethiopia (1994-2006) 
Togo (1981-2005) 
Gabon (1981-2006) 
Tunisia (1981-2006) 
Ghana (1981-2006) 
Uganda (1984-2006) 
Guinea (1988-2006) 
Zambia (1981-2006) 
Kenya (1981-2006) 
Zimbabwe (1981-2005) 
Lesotho (1981-2006) 
Madagascar (1981-2006) 
Malawi (1981-2006) 
Mali (1981-2006) 
Mauritania (1981-2006) 
Mauritius (1982-2006) 
Morocco (1981-2006) 
Panama (1982-2006) 
Paraguay (1991-2006) 
Peru (1981-2006) 
St. Lucia (2001-2005) 
Suriname (2001-2006) 
Uruguay (1984-2006) 
Pacific (3) 
Fiji (1981-2006) 
Papua New Guinea (2001-2003) 
Samoa (2001-2006) 
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Appendix 2: Data sources 
Data Source 
Net ODA, net disbursement and current USD OECD DAC website 
Net ODA, commitment and current USD Idem 
Concessional loans, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Grants, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Multilateral ODA, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Bilateral ODA, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Humanitarian aid, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Food aid, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Technical cooperation, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Debt forgiveness, net disbursement and current USD Idem 
Other official flows, current USD Idem 
Private flows, current USD Idem 
Consumption of fixed capital/GNP (%) World Development Indicators 2008 
GDP, constant 2000 Idem 
GDP, current USD Idem 
GNP, current USD Idem 
Population Idem 
Terms of trade (net barter terms) basis 100 in 2000 Idem 
Agricultural value added, constant 2000 USD Idem 
British colonization Authors 
French colonization Idem 
Island Idem 
Landlocked Idem 
 
